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INTRODUCTION
On seemingly countless occasions, we have had to advise potential
clients that apart from abiding by particular laws—mainly antidiscrimination and retaliation statutes—employers are typically free to
treat (and mistreat) employees as they wish. Courts have repeatedly
emphasized that there is no “general civility code” for the workplace.1
† Andrew Melzer is a Partner at Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, a national civil rights law firm.
David Tracey is Senior Litigation Counsel at Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP.
1 E.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998).
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Employees likewise have limited protections from mass layoffs.
Employers may generally fire their “at-will” employees at any time for
any reason—including a bad reason, a nonsensical reason, or no reason
at all.2 Simply put, employers may act against employees’ interests. Their
conduct is typically bounded only by the dog-eat-dog “morals of the
market place.”3 In this context, discerning a viable claim, even where an
employee has been seriously mistreated, can be like trying to fit a round
peg into a square hole.
Paradoxically, the law holds employees to a higher standard than
their employers. Derived from feudal law governing the master-servant
relationship, an employee’s overarching legal commitment to his or her
employer is commonly known as the “duty of loyalty” and bears the
anachronistic stamp of its age.4 Under this doctrine, employees have strict
and affirmative obligations to act in the best interests of their employers
at all times; some courts have described a trusted employee’s obligation
as one of “uberrima fides”—or utmost good faith.5 Employees have also
often been characterized as owing a fiduciary duty to their employers.6
The consequences of an employee’s breach of these duties are
severe. Generally, an employee who breaches the duty of loyalty is liable
for any actual damages or harm, including monies received, which are
deemed to rightfully belong to the employer as principal.7 However,
under New York’s “faithless servant” doctrine, the employee must also
forfeit and disgorge all compensation received during the period of

2 See, e.g., Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (N.Y. 1983) (noting
that at-will employment “may be freely terminated by either party at any time for any reason or
even for no reason”; and declining to recognize a common law exception for abusive or wrongful
discharge).
3 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
4 See generally Marian K. Riedy & Kim Sperduto, At-Will Fiduciaries? The Anomalies of a
“Duty of Loyalty” in the Twenty-First Century, 93 NEB. L. REV. 267, 271, 296-99, 311 (2014).
5 Mar. Fish Prods., Inc. v. World-Wide Fish Prods., Inc., 474 N.Y.S.2d 281, 286 (App. Div.
1984); see also, e.g., W. Elec. Co. v. Brenner, 360 N.E.2d 1091, 1094 (N.Y. 1977) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“[A]n employee is to be loyal to his employer and is prohibited
from acting in any manner inconsistent with his agency or trust and is at all times bound to exercise
the utmost good faith and loyalty in the performance of his duties.”); Poller v. BioScrip, Inc., 974
F. Supp. 2d 204, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (collecting cases on an employee’s duty of good faith and
loyalty under New York law).
6 Variations in the duty of loyalty between jurisdictions are explored by Riedy and Sperduto.
Riedy & Sperduto, supra note 4, at 271-83.
7 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. (d)(1) (2006) (“An agent’s breach
subjects the agent to liability for loss that the breach causes the principal.”); see also id. at cmt. (c)
(noting that fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty, apply to employees); Riedy & Sperduto,
supra note 4, at 278-79 (noting the various remedies available to employers for breach of the duty
of loyalty).
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disloyalty, regardless of whether his or her conduct has caused the
employer any injury or harm.8
This lopsided duty of loyalty exacerbates the inordinate power that
employers possess over their workers.9 Despite the enactment of various
employee rights and protections, the employment relationship remains
essentially undemocratic.10 Today, workers are heavily dependent on
their employers for their livelihood and well-being. Even with programs
such as Social Security and Medicare/Medicaid, much of the social safety
net is tied up in one’s employment.11 Employees also spend a significant
portion of their time in the workplace, and their employment takes on a
dominant role in their lives.12 Employers often encroach on their workers’
private lives, sometimes directly (e.g., by monitoring employees’
physical activities)13 and sometimes indirectly (e.g., by imposing on-call
scheduling or irregular shifts that throw workers’ lives into disarray).14

8 See, e.g., Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184, 200-05 (2d Cir. 2003) (per
curiam). Under such types of doctrines, employer claims against employees have significantly
increased in recent years. See generally Matthew P. Holt, When the Hand that Feeds Bites:
Exploring Claims by Employers Against Employees, 43 N.M. L. REV. 491 (2013).
9 See Riedy & Sperduto, supra note 4, at 285-86 (“The party wielding the power and control
is the employer, yet it is the employee who owes the so-called fiduciary duty.”).
10 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES
(AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) xxii, 62-64 (2017).
11 Health insurance and retirement savings are two prominent examples of this employer-based
social safety net. Roughly half the population receives employer-sponsored medical insurance and
retirement benefits. See Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(2018)
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/?currentTimeframe=0&
selectedDistributions=employer&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%
22:% 22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/SN6K-AKMU] (noting that half of the population received
employer-sponsored medical insurance); THE SIGHTLINES PROJECT, SPECIAL REPORT: SEEING
OUR WAY TO FINANCIAL SECURITY IN THE AGE OF INCREASED LONGEVITY 19, 22, 28 (2018),
http://longevity.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Sightlines-Financial-Security-SpecialReport-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8KK-MYAN] (noting that half of the population receives
employer sponsored retirement benefits). Notably, a U.S. Government website designed for public
education on retirement savings identifies employer-sponsored plans as the public’s “most common
option[]” for retirement savings. See Retirement, USA.GOV https://www.usa.gov/retirement
[https://perma.cc/2CKH-5ATH] (last visited Aug. 4, 2020).
12 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 135-38 (detailing the various abuses and indignities
suffered by workers, particularly lower wage workers).
13 See id. at 49 (describing how employer “wellness programs” under the Affordable Care Act
may regulate employees’ physical activities); Christopher Rowland, With Fitness Trackers in the
Workplace, Bosses Can Monitor Your Every Step—and Possibly More, WASH. POST (Feb. 16,
2019, 7:13 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/with-fitness-trackers-in-theworkplace-bosses-can-monitor-your-every-step—and-possibly-more/2019/02/15/75ee0848-2a4511e9-b011-d8500644dc98_story.html [https://perma.cc/SFZ9-36J4].
14 See ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 136 (noting how “unpredictable schedules . . . wreak
havoc with the private lives of workers”); Claire Cain Miller, How Unpredictable Work Hours Turn
Families Upside Down, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/16/upshot/
unpredictable-job-hours.html [https://perma.cc/362M-NK42].
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Especially with the ongoing decline in labor union participation,15
employees have few tools to balance the scales. Quitting the job—at-will
employees’ presumed bargaining chip—comes with too many risks: the
loss of an income and (for many employees) the loss of healthcare and
retirement benefits.16 “Voting with one’s feet” may simply not be a viable
option for most workers, particularly in difficult economic times.
Duties of loyalty are designed to regulate such one-sided
relationships, particularly those in which one party entrusts the other to
manage or control something of value.17 Corporate directors, for
example, owe fiduciary duties to shareholders, who have entrusted them
with the management of the company.18 ERISA fiduciaries owe duties of
loyalty to plan participants, who depend on the fiduciaries to manage their
retirement plans.19 Similarly, in the case of employees’ duty of loyalty,
some courts have reasoned that the employment relationship “involves an
element of confidence” that goes “beyond that merely of doing the work
which [the employee] is employed to do.”20
In modern times, however, employers and employees are more than
master and servant or principal and agent. Given the outdated
underpinnings of this doctrine in the employment context, some
commentators have proposed abolishing or modifying the ordinary

15 See Drew DeSilver, 10 Facts About American Workers, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/29/facts-about-american-workers
[https://perma.cc/9LN4-REFA] (noting that the labor union participation rate fell by half between
1983 and 2018).
16 See ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 139 (“Much of the time, the entire economy operates in
periods of substantial unemployment or underemployment, affecting workers generally: even if
they have a job, the cost of job loss is so high they have to put up with nearly any abuse just to hang
on to an income.”); id. at 141 (describing barriers that prevent workers from leaving their jobs); cf.
Todd Gabe, et al., Can Low-Wage Workers Find Better Jobs?, 846 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. 1, 9-10
(2018) (reporting relatively low levels of labor mobility at all quartiles of the job quality: most
workers stay in their jobs). Anderson also notes that the proliferation of non-compete clauses has
impeded employees’ ability to exit their jobs. ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 66.
17 See Riedy & Sperduto, supra note 4, at 284 (noting that fiduciary relationships involve one
party ceding “both trust and power” to another party: “it is that risk the special obligations imposed
on a fiduciary are intended to eliminate or reduce.”).
18 Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 25 (N.Y. 1984) (citation omitted) (“Because
the power to manage the affairs of a corporation is vested in the directors and majority shareholders,
they are cast in the fiduciary role of ‘guardians of the corporate welfare.’”); see also Riedy &
Sperduto, supra note 4, at 284 (“Thus, shareholders cede both trust and power to corporate officers
and directors . . . .”).
19 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2018) (imposing a duty of loyalty); see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(21)(A) (defining a fiduciary as, inter alia, someone who exercises “discretionary authority
or discretionary control” over plan management or assets).
20 Coffey v. Burke, 116 N.Y.S. 514, 132 (App. Div. 1909) (“An employee, though not in a
position of trust or confidence as those terms are generally employed, owes a duty of loyalty to the
employer beyond that merely of doing the work which he is employed to do. The relation itself
involves an element of confidence.”).
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employee’s duty of loyalty to his or her employer.21 This prescription
may well be compelling. However, we venture a somewhat different
approach here. We propose that the duty of loyalty owed by workers to
their employers be made reciprocal: employers should also owe a general
duty of loyalty and care towards their employees. In today’s economy,
workers indeed cede significant control over their lives to their
employers.22 Thus, the social compact between employer and employee
should not run in one direction in which the weaker party owes fealty to
the stronger. This new principle—likely to be enacted by statute—could
be accomplished as part of a broader Workers’ Bill of Rights or as a
stand-alone measure.
I. WHAT WOULD A RECIPROCAL DUTY OF LOYALTY MEAN IN
PRACTICE?
In our view, an employer’s duty of loyalty should, at minimum, start
with a commitment not to harm employees arbitrarily, gratuitously, or in
bad faith. This obligation can incorporate critical concepts from the
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.23 Under the
covenant, even where one party exercises contractual discretion, it must
do so reasonably and in good faith, in accordance with applicable
commercial norms; a party may not exercise its discretion capriciously or
do so to undermine the purposes of the relationship, to defeat the
reasonable expectations of the other party, or to prevent the other party
from receiving the fruits of the contract.24 The covenant also
encompasses duties of honesty and candor.25

21 See Riedy & Sperduto, supra note 4, at 271, 301-11; see also Holt, supra note 8, at 525
(proposing elimination of the common law duty of loyalty in favor of a requirement that any such
duties be explicitly stated in employment contracts); Charles A. Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless
Servant?: Reconciling Employment Law, Contract Law, and Fiduciary Duty, 2011 WIS. L. REV.
777, 819 (2011) (proposing a limitation of the faithless servant doctrine to high-level employees).
22 See generally ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 37-41, 49-50, 135-38 (describing the power
employers have over workers’ lives); see also supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
23 Riedy and Sperduto maintain that employees’ broad duty of loyalty and good faith toward
their employers should be scrapped and replaced by a mutual and reciprocal duty of good faith and
fair dealing alone. Riedy & Sperduto, supra note 4, at 307-10. Notably, employers may already be
bound by aspects of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in a handful of jurisdictions. See id. at
309-10, 309 n.221.
24 See, e.g., Dalton v. Educ. Testing Serv., 663 N.E.2d 289, 291-92 (N.Y. 1995); Legend
Autorama, Ltd. v. Audi of Am., Inc., 954 N.Y.S.2d 141, 143-44 (App. Div. 2012) (citation omitted)
(“[E]ven an explicitly discretionary contract right may not be exercised in bad faith so as to frustrate
the other party’s right to the benefit under the agreement.”).
25 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (AM. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“‘Good faith,’
except as otherwise provided in Article 5, means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing.”).
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In addition, employers should consider and look out for the interests
of their employees in all transactions and, where reasonably possible,
refrain from acting against employees’ interests. In parallel with aspects
of employees’ duty of loyalty, employers must not engage in self-dealing
to enrich themselves at their employees’ expense.26
At its heart, our proposed employer duty of loyalty would mirror the
duties employees now owe their employers. While the borders of an
employee’s duty of loyalty may be somewhat blurred, at its center, an
employee is generally prohibited from acting in an adversarial manner
towards his or her employer—such as by competing with the employer,
diverting potential business opportunities, and divulging or exploiting
confidences. Employers should therefore also be precluded from
engaging in adversarial, self-aggrandizing conduct toward their
employees. The most straightforward and clear-cut applications of a
reciprocal duty of loyalty would prevent employers from self-dealing on
the backs of employees. Less straightforward uses would address other
practices that harm workers and may seem incompatible with concepts of
loyalty, care, good faith, and fair dealing; such applications are worth
positing for discussion and consideration.
The specific manifestations of an employer duty of loyalty and good
faith—to be fleshed out in legislation, interpretative regulations and
guidance, and judicial interpretation—could be manifold. We set forth a
few possible examples here, both of the straightforward and perhaps less
straightforward variety.
II. AT THE HEART OF THE DUTY
A.

Reformation of the “At-Will” Employment Doctrine

While an employer might not need good cause to fire employees, a
bad faith reason should not suffice.27 Nor may the employer engage in

26 The business community has begun to adopt similar standards. See Business Roundtable
Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy that Serves All Americans’, BUS.
ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019) https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtableredefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans
[https://perma.cc/XD9T-96GG]. In August 2019, the Business Roundtable issued a new Statement
on the Purpose of the Corporation, which modified its prior focus on “shareholder primacy” and
affirmed a commitment to various stakeholders, including employees. Id. The Roundtable now
promotes “[i]nvesting in our employees. This starts with compensating them fairly and providing
important benefits. It also includes supporting them through training and education that help
develop new skills for a rapidly changing world. We foster diversity and inclusion, dignity and
respect.” Id.
27 Legal developments and proposals for barring or limiting bad faith discharges are hardly
new. See, e.g., Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
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dishonest or deceitful conduct. One common example of an underhanded
motive would be terminating an employee to avoid paying compensation
owed to the employee or about to become vested or due.28 Just as an
employee may not act to undercut the employer’s interests while in its
employ, an employer should not be able to inflict harm on an employee
out of a nakedly self-interested purpose.
In like fashion, an employer should not be able to surreptitiously
plan and engage in mass layoffs or outsourcing of jobs just to marginally
boost the company’s stock price. The desire to satisfy shareholders
should be mitigated by an obligation to look after the security and wellbeing of employees. Of course, downsizing is permitted when reasonably
warranted to safeguard the future of the organization. But the employer
should be forthright with its workers at every stage of the process
(WARN Act notice, which does not cover all employees or all
situations,29 is a useful but inadequate step). The employer should also
document its rationale and processes for arriving at its decision. And, it
should not subordinate employees’ interests to outsized executive
bonuses and equivalent perks. The duty of loyalty should preclude
businesses and their executives from unduly enriching themselves on the
backs of their workers.30
Such protections are all the more imperative due to ongoing trends
such as the mass outsourcing of certain jobs abroad,31 as well as the
growing gap in pay between workers and executives.32 With exorbitant
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Protecting At
Will Employees]. Now, as in 1980, the United States is unique among industrialized countries in
lacking comprehensive, nationwide protections against wrongful discharge. Id. at 1844. This is
particularly striking when considered against employees’ common law duty of loyalty.
28 See, e.g., Riedy & Sperduto, supra note 4, at 310; York v. Zurich Scudder Invs., Inc., 849
N.E.2d 892, 899 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (“[W]here an at-will employee has been terminated in bad
faith, such as where an employer has acted to deprive an employee of a commission due, or about
to be due, and to benefit financially at the employee’s expense, the employee may recover
compensation for work performed.”). Notably, statutes such as ERISA and the FMLA already
prohibit employers from interfering with certain benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2018) (prohibiting
interference with protected rights under ERISA); 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2018) (prohibiting interference
with exercise of rights under the FMLA).
29 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (2018).
30 Likewise, while “[d]ismissals that are part of large-scale coordinated layoffs necessitated by
an economic downturn, for example, generally would be valid. . . . [A]n employer should not be
free to use an economic downturn as a pretense to expel preselected employees.” Note, Protecting
At Will Employees, supra note 27, at 1841. In other words, ulterior motives should not enter the
equation.
31 See, e.g., ANDERSON supra note 10, at 139 (“Workers of all races who live in towns
devastated from plant closures due to competition from abroad also suffer from high
unemployment, because their mobility is low.”).
32 Lawrence Mishel & Julia Wolfe, CEO Compensation Has Grown 940% Since 1978, ECON.
POL’Y INST. (Aug. 14, 2019) https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-compensation-2018
[https://perma.cc/R5TE-F9XN].
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executive compensation packages, and stagnant, or even declining wages
for workers, the pay gap has reached virtually unprecedented levels: Over
the last 40 years, CEO compensation has increased by nearly 1,000%,
while the pay of ordinary workers has risen by only 11.9%.33 As a result,
CEOs now make 278 times what the average worker does, with some
garnering compensation in the tens or even hundreds of millions of
dollars.34 These skewed practices run counter to a duty of loyalty. It is
especially disingenuous for companies to claim financial hardship and to
impose fiscal austerity measures to the detriment of workers after
lavishing their executives in this manner.
B.

Safeguarding Employee Benefits

Absent unusual and unforeseen circumstances, employers should
abide by their promises and representations to workers. It is disloyal for
a company to place itself above its workers and to renege on
commitments on which they have relied. Employers should not be
allowed to slash or eliminate employee benefits—such as retirement and
health benefits—when they are no longer seen as convenient to the
bottom line. As with mass layoffs, a duty of loyalty would force
employers to undergo a transparent and well-documented process to
justify reductions of employee benefits as necessary to safeguard the
future of their businesses. Similarly, employers should not be able to
designate workers as independent contractors for the purposes of evading
employment benefits. We have seen circumstances in which employers
manipulate the system by firing workers en masse just to hire them back
as “contractors.” This is inconsistent with a duty of loyalty, and workers
should not have to prove that they qualify as “employees” under one legal
test or another in order to be protected and to recover damages.
Employers should not be in the business of grabbing from their workers.
As highlighted by recent debates over the coronavirus economic
stimulus package, corporations should not be able to accept large cash
bailouts or tax cuts from the government—designed to stabilize those
businesses, protect current workers, and incentivize new hiring—only to
turn around and expend the funds on executive perks or stock buybacks.35
Appropriating public money, intended to safeguard employees’ jobs and

33

Id.
Id.
35 See Matt Phillips, The Stock Buyback Binge May Be Over. For Now., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/24/business/coronavirus-stock-buybacks.html
[https://perma.cc/CS2L-B7BV] (discussing changing political attitudes towards stock buybacks
and noting the bi-partisan support for a prohibition on stock buybacks in the coronavirus stimulus
package).
34
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benefits, for private corporate gain would be incompatible with the
mandate of good faith and fair dealing.
In our view, these are fairly clear-cut implications of the duty we
propose. It would remain to be seen how they are reconciled with a
corporation’s duty to its shareholders. But, in our understanding, the duty
to shareholders does not carry an obligation to mistreat employees or to
squeeze every last cent from them. The duty to shareholders does not
preclude good business practices and corporate stewardship.36 This is
particularly the case when the benefits gleaned from harming employees
will accrue primarily to the company’s principals and executives.
III. IN THE POSSIBLE PENUMBRAS
A less straightforward and more expansive potential application
would involve a broader transformation of the employment “at will”
rubric in a manner that supplements existing employment laws. It may be
argued that liability for discharging a worker based upon personal
characteristics having nothing to do with one’s abilities, performance, or
conduct in the workplace should not revolve solely on whether one comes
within a specific protected category. Legislatures have codified
protections based on race, gender, and other enumerated categories out
of societal recognition that these forms of discrimination are most glaring
and pernicious;37 their prevalence and devastating impact are not to be
underestimated. Still, terminations predicated on other job-immaterial
traits can also be arbitrary, unjustified, and highly damaging.38
Indeed, a duty of loyalty and fair dealing could potentially offer a
means for courts to adapt employment discrimination law to society’s
evolving norms.39 Federal law, as well as the laws of many states and

36 See Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 27, at 1833-36 (observing that
“[a]rbitrary or economically unjustified dismissals can have detrimental repercussions” for both
employees and employers and that expanded liability on the part of employers would have
beneficial effects, notably including increased worker productivity resulting from greater employee
job security and satisfaction). The business community appears to agree. See supra note 26.
37 See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-101 (2020) (effective Aug. 27, 2020) (“In the city of
New York, with its great cosmopolitan population, there is no greater danger to the health, morals,
safety and welfare of the city and its inhabitants than the existence of groups prejudiced against one
another and antagonistic to each other because of their actual or perceived differences . . . .”); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 290(3) (McKinney 2020) (“The legislature hereby finds and declares that the state
has the responsibility to act to assure that every individual within this state is afforded an equal
opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life . . . .”).
38 Development of the law in this direction would traverse the relatively narrow conception of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing (without an obligation of loyalty) advanced by Riedy and
Sperduto. See Riedy & Sperduto, supra note 4, at 309-10.
39 Our firm has also argued that non-discrimination precepts—incorporated in professional
ethics rules and standards, see, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (N.Y. STATE
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municipalities, do not explicitly protect caregiver or familial status,
political affiliation, personal appearance, and a variety of other personal
characteristics.40 A duty of loyalty and good faith could offer an avenue
for workers to achieve such protections without having to persuade courts
that they already fall within enumerated protected classifications.41
Similarly, one may argue, an employer should be prohibited from
gratuitously subjecting employees to other forms of hostile or abusive
conduct. Sheer meanness and pettiness—if rising to a sufficient threshold
of materiality and harm—may not comport with a duty of loyalty and
good faith. There should be a place for civility at work. Even if not driven
by a protected trait, extreme forms of workplace incivility needlessly
harm workers, damage productivity, and benefit no one.
If this conception of the duty of loyalty and care were adopted, an
employer would still remain liable for discriminating against or
differentiating between workers based on recognized categories or
characteristics. But employers could also be liable for gratuitously
abusing or injuring employees for any illegitimate reason.42
UNIFIED COURT SYS. 2018); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2018)—are an inherent part of the contractual bargain of good faith and fair dealing in the legal
field, and should apply even if certain technical requirements of statutes such as Title VII are not
met. Note that the covenant, with its emphasis on commercial norms, may often be industry
specific.
40 Certain states and municipalities already prohibit employment discrimination based on these
characteristics. See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(1) (2020) (effective Aug. 28, 2020)
(including “marital status, partnership status, caregiver status, [and] sexual and reproductive health
decisions” among protected characteristics); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 2020)
(including “familial status, marital status, [and] status as a victim of domestic violence” among
protected characteristics); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.11(a) (West 2020) (including “marital status,
personal appearance, . . . family responsibilities, . . . matriculation, political affiliation, status as a
victim or family member of a victim of domestic violence, a sexual offense, or stalking, or credit
information” among protected characteristics); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a) (West 2020)
(including medical condition and marital status among protected characteristics); S.F., CAL. POLICE
CODE § 3303(a) (2020) (including height and weight among protected characteristics). However,
such protections have not yet been universally adopted or fully incorporated into existing law.
41 Cf. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) (interpreting Title VII’s
prohibition on discrimination “because of sex” to cover discrimination on the basis of an
employee’s sexual orientation or gender identity); Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate
Treatment of Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION (May 23, 2007), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidanceunlawful-disparate-treatment-workers-caregiving-responsibilities#background
[https://perma.cc/D7ZJ-ZBBM] (“Although the federal EEO laws do not prohibit discrimination
against caregivers per se, there are circumstances in which discrimination against caregivers might
constitute unlawful disparate treatment.”).
42 We note that the Restatement of Employment Law proposes an implied default contractual
term preventing employers from firing workers from engaging in off-duty activities that implicate
their personal autonomy, unless the employer can prove that the employee’s activity interfered with
its legitimate business interests. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.08 (AM. LAW INST.
2015). The Reporters’ Notes indicate that this proposal may be an offshoot or species of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but recognize that it is a “departure from existing law.” Id.
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Another potentially more creative usage would entail revision of the
law on arbitration agreements, likely through a federal statute to undo
recent judicial interpretations and applications of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA).43 In the employment context, arbitration clauses inure to the
benefit of employers at the expense of employees.44 Such clauses are used
to curtail employees’ ability to achieve redress for substantive legal
violations.45 By imposing such compulsory provisions, employers are
able to secure waivers of important rights belonging to their employees
while offering them little if anything meaningful in return.46 This may be
seen as inflicting harm on workers out of pure self-interest. Indeed, the
present jurisprudential regime on arbitration is the culmination of decades
of industry strategy designed to erode the rights and remedies of
employees and consumers.47
In our professional experience, the vast majority of employees who
are subject to arbitration clauses are entirely unaware of such obligations
until they are injured and seek to sue for redress. Employers frequently
bury such agreements in a sheath of mandatory paperwork. In some
instances, workers do not need to sign at all: They are deemed bound
simply by remaining employed after some modicum of notice is
provided. Employers can even change the terms of employment
midstream, imposing new arbitration requirements through a bulletin

reporters’ notes, cmt. f; see also William R. Corbett, Finding a Better Way Around Employment At
Will: Protecting Employees’ Autonomy Interests Through Tort Law, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 1071,
1077-78, 1078 n.32 (2018); see generally Matthew T. Bodie, The Best Way Out Is Always
Through: Changing the Employment At-Will Default Rule to Protect Personal Autonomy, 2017 U.
ILL. L. REV. 223 (2017).
43 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2018). Such legislation has been introduced in Congress, titled the
Arbitration Fairness Act and the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act. See generally
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017); Arbitration Fairness for
Consumers Act, S. 630, 116th Cong. (2019); Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423,
116th Cong. (2019); Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, S. 610, 116th Cong. (2019).
Legislative efforts have also been made at the state and local level. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7515
(McKinney 2020). Duties of loyalty, good faith, and fair dealing could help to provide conceptual
grounding and framework for these types of bills.
44 See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are
Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309,
1333-52 (2015) (describing the various ways in which arbitration impedes access to justice for
workers).
45 See id. at 1309-12.
46 See Ann C. Hodges, Employee Voice in Arbitration, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 235,
238-40 (2018) (describing various ways in which employers may impose arbitration agreements
on employees and the generally negative impact arbitration has on employee access to justice).
47 See, e.g., Cooper v. QC Fin. Servs., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1287-88 (D. Ariz. 2006),
report and recommendation adopted, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Ariz. 2007); see generally Joshua
T. Mandelbaum, Note, Stuck in a Bind: Can the Arbitration Fairness Act Solve the Problems of
Mandatory Binding Arbitration in the Consumer Context?, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1075 (2009).
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devised—to the greatest extent possible—to fly under the radar.48 In any
case, employees rarely elect to arbitrate their claims voluntarily and with
full knowledge and understanding of the consequences; instead, they are
compelled to do so as a condition of employment.
Yet, the consequences of submitting to an employer’s arbitration
demands are quite acute. Employees relinquish basic legal and
constitutional rights to pursue claims in open court before a jury of their
peers. In arbitration, the deck is often stacked in favor of the employer.
Further, under recent Supreme Court law, by imposing mandatory
arbitration, employers are able to secure otherwise impermissible waivers
of class and collective action rights.49 Without efficient collective
remedies, employees’ substantive rights may be rendered a dead letter.50
An employer duty of loyalty and care to workers could help to
ameliorate this harsh scenario. Employers should not be able to trick or
coerce employees into forfeiting their rights through arbitration clauses
imposed as a condition of employment. Invocation of the duty seems
particularly compelling when an employer foists new arbitration
requirements on current workers as opposed to new hires. However, it is
arguable that the duty should not be so restricted in its reach. Under a
system animated by bonds of good faith and fair dealing, employers
should not be entitled to force ordinary workers into arbitration or to use
such arbitration clauses to secure waivers of rights, which would not be
permitted outside of the arbitration context. Rather, employers should
potentially be limited to entering negotiated arm’s-length arbitration
agreements with those possessing at least roughly commensurate
bargaining power: executive-level employees and perhaps labor unions
acting with the benefit of legal advice.
IV. SUGGESTED LIMITING PRINCIPLES
Like any doctrine, the duty of loyalty should not be limitless but
circumscribed by reasonable boundaries. As in many areas of law, these
48 See Hodges, supra note 46, at 239-40 (“Employers use a variety of methods to get agreement
from their employees, some employed to obscure their intent.”).
49 See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013); AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
50 See Sternlight, supra note 44, at 1343-52 (describing the harm class action waivers impose
on worker rights and access to justice). We note, however, that in certain cases, employees have
been able to file hundreds, or even thousands, of individual arbitrations, causing their employers’
tactics to backfire. Even there, employers have sought court intervention to save them from their
own arbitration contracts. See Braden Campbell, New Postmates Suit Pans Workers’ ‘Abusive
Tactics’, LAW360 (Mar. 26, 2020, 9:58 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1257424
[https://perma.cc/YH23-QGEC]; Dorothy Atkins, Postmates Still Can’t Pause 10K Wage
Arbitration Proceedings, LAW360 (Apr. 16, 2020, 7:04 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1264176 [https://perma.cc/G7ZD-L6BE].
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can generally be determined through the interpretative and iterative
process. The universal contractual covenant of good faith and fair
dealing—on which our proposal is largely predicated—has proven
relatively workable to administer.51 Moreover, our proposed duty of
loyalty would comport with the familiar business judgment rule, which
does not shelter illegal activity, self-dealing, or other illicit breaches of
loyalty, care, or good faith.52 Under our proposal, proprietors would
maintain their general prerogative to act in the perceived best interests of
the business—as long as they are not arbitrarily and gratuitously inflicting
harm on workers.
Under the approach set forth above in Sections II–III, the duty would
not result in the outright abolishment of employment “at will,” but would
merely mitigate that prevailing construct with common-sense constraints.
In most instances, employers could still freely discharge workers, so long
as they took such action in good faith. In other words, our proposal would
“limit the employer’s discretionary power in order to prevent bad faith
discharges, not [] give employees permanent job security.”53
While imposing a reciprocal duty on employers and employees does
not necessarily demand a one-to-one correspondence in the specific
obligations owed by each side, at least a reasonable correlation is
advisable. Exposition of the details of an employer’s duty should be
guided by existing authority regarding employees’ duty of loyalty as well
as the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
CONCLUSION
The backbone of employment law derives from centuries-old
concepts of master and servant, developed in pre-modern England.54
Over time, we have developed republican forms of government, but the
employment relationship remains fundamentally undemocratic. As a
result, significant aspects of employees’ lives are subject to the unilateral
control of their employers.55 Despite this, employers are ordinarily
unrestrained in their dealings with employees, while, paradoxically,

51 See, e.g., Riedy & Sperduto, supra note 4, at 308-11; Note, Protecting At Will Employees,
supra note 27, at 1840.
52 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006) (holding that
the business judgment deference can be rebutted “if the plaintiff shows that the directors breached
their fiduciary duty of care or of loyalty or acted in bad faith.” If shown, “the burden then shifts to
the director[s] . . . to demonstrate that the challenged act or transaction was entirely fair to the
corporation and its shareholders.”).
53 Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 27, at 1840.
54 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
55 See generally ANDERSON, supra note 10.
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employees owe their employers “uberrima fides.”56 Our current
assemblage of labor and employment statutes and regulations tempers
this regime and provides important protections to workers, but it is
incomplete. A more comprehensive approach is called for. Here, we
propose replacing the one-sided duty of loyalty—a prominent vestige of
the master-servant origins of employment law—with reciprocal
obligations, under which employers owe a duty of loyalty and good faith
to their employees. Implementing such a concept would help bring the
American workplace into the twenty-first century and ensure that
workers’ interests are appropriately considered in all circumstances.

56

Supra note 5 and accompanying text.

